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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
Burden Of Proof Of Affirmative Defenses In
Criminal Cases
Gunther v. State'
Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the
second degree. Although he did not deny mortally wound-
ing his brother-in-law with a rifle, he presented evidence
to show that he had done so in self-defense. On appeal,
defendant objected to the refusal of the trial court to give
certain requested instructions to the jury concerning the
law of self-defense. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial, agreeing with defendant
that the trial court should have informed the jury more
fully of the essential elements of self-defense as applicable
to the circumstances in this case.2
However, the court affirmed the refusal of the trial
court to inform the jury that the jury ". . . should find the
defendant not guilty if, on the whole of the evidence, it
had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in
self-defense." The issue to be considered is what is the
law of the burden of proof3 in a criminal trial when an
affirmative defense is raised?4
'228 Md. 404, 179 A. 2d 880 (1962).
2 Id., 409. Specifically, (1) the trial court should have informed the jury
that if the defendant was not seeking a fight but was apprehensive that
he might be attacked by the deceased, the defendant would have a right to
arm himself in anticipation of the assault and "that the right of the de-
fendant to go wherever he legally had a right to go was not abridged by
the fact that he might be attacked . . ." and (2) the jury, in determining
who was the aggressor and whether the defendant was apprehensive of
danger, could consider evidence of the violent and dangerous character of
the deceased known to the defendant.
8 The term "burden of proof" is itself a source of confusion. McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 306, 307 (1954), points out that there are actually two cate-
gories of "burden of proof." The first burden is the burden of initially
producing evidence or of going forward with the evidence. This burden
generally lies on each issue with the party who would be given an adverse
ruling on the particular issue if no evidence were presented by either side.
The second "burden of proof" is more literally a burden of persuasion. It
relates to the burden of convincing ithe trier of fact on an issue and also
refers to the standard to be used by the trier of fact in making its determi-
nation. The two standards most generally employed are the burden of
persuasion by a preponderance of evidence (or to the satisfaction of 'the
trier of fact), and the 'burden of persuasion beyond 'a reasonable doubt
(or to a moral certainty). The burden of persuasion, respectively, on the
opponent would then be to convince the trier of fact that the issue is at
least evenly divided, and that at least a reasonable doubt exists. As noted
in 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940) the frequent ambiguous use
by the courts of the single term "burden of proof" without making clear
which of its uses is 'being set forth, and the courts' apparent failure at
times to understand the distinction of uses, have further compounded the
confusion.41nitial Burden of the Prosecution. In a criminal case the burden
is on the prosecution for all the facts which are material to the crime,
GUNTHER v. STATE
After the state has made out its case, the accused may
interpose an affirmative defense, which is a reliance on dis-
tinct substantive matter to exempt him from punishment
and absolve him from responsibility. 5 Affirmative defenses 6
might include certain kinds of intoxication, duress, reason-
able belief of necessity to avoid a greater harm or evil,
execution of a public duty, self-protection, protection of
property, mental disease or defect, military orders, unfor-
seeable accidents, double jeopardy, alibi, license, statutory
exception and entrapment.
The situations in the above list might be divided into
three separate classifications: (1) non-participation; (2)
legal exemption; and (3) lack of mens tea.
(1) Non-Participation. Alibi, although sometimes clas-
sified as an affirmative defense, is distinguishable from the
other situations because it does not seek to justify or find
a legal excuse for the criminal conduct, but rather, it is a
mere form of denial of participation in the criminal act.'
Since the prosecution has the initial burden of proving the
presence of the accused at the scene of the crime, it seems
logical that the defendant is entitled to acquittal if his alibi
testimony raises a reasonable doubt as to his presence at
the scene.' However, a minority view requires the accused
to establish this defense, not merely to the point where a
reasonable doubt is raised, but by a preponderance of the
1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 16 (12th ed. 1955). In order to establish
its case, the prosecution must prove the commission of the crime, Nor-
wood v. State, 45 Md. 68, 75 (1876), by the accused, Berry v. State, 202
Md. 62, 67, 95 A. 2d 319 (1953), within the period of statutory limitations
where applicable, Ruble v. State, 177 Md. 600, 11 A. 2d 455 (1940), within
the prosecutor's venue, Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 200, 151 A. 2d 120(1959). WHARTON, supra, § 15, states that there is a conflict as to whether
the prosecution must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt or merely
by a preponderance of evidence. It is for the court to determine whether
the evidence so presented by the prosecution is of legal sufficiency to sustain
a conviction, 7 M.L.E., Criminal Law §§ 434, 435 (1961). The question of
whether the evidence establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reason-
able doubt is for the trier of facts to decide, Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404,
411, 179 A. 2d 880 (1962). The initial burden of the prosecution, therefore,
is to present sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict for the accused
at the conclusion of the State's case. The State may produce sufficient
evidence so that the defendant will find himself in a situation which, from
a practical standpoint, demands that he offer evidence in rejoinder. This
is often explained by saying that the burden of going forward with the
evidence shifts to the defendant. However, the burden of proof never
shifts from the prosecution, WHARTON, supra, § 13.
5 20 AM. Jun., Evidence § 153.8 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08-2.10, 3.02, 3.04, 3.06, 4.03 (Proposed Official
Draft, May 4, 1962); AM. JuR., Homicide §§ 290, 293, 294; WHARTON, op.
cit. supra, note 4, §§ 20, 24.
7 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (1954).
8 People v. Silvia, 389 Ill. 346, 59 N.E. 2d 821 (1945); HoCHHEIMER,
CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 157 (2d ed. 1904).
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evidence.' The Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted the
majority view, stating:
"An alibi of the accused, proceeding as it does upon
the idea that he was elsewhere at the time of the com-
mission of the crime, does, of course, if thoroughly
established, preclude the possibility of guilt.... If the
jury, considering all the evidence, inculpatory and ex-
culpatory, entertain a reasonable doubt of the defend-
ant's participation in the crime, they should acquit
him. Thus a defendant is entitled to acquittal if the
alibi testimony, taken into consideration with all the
other evidence in the case, raises a reasonable doubt
of guilt."' 0
(2) Legal Exemption. Double jeopardy, license and
statutory exceptions" might be classified as legal exemp-
tion defenses. As defenses they do not attack any consti-
tuent element of the crime. For example, Article 27, Sec-
tion 36 of the Maryland Code declares it to be a crime to
carry a concealed weapon. However, subsection (b) of
section 36 provides that "nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent the carrying of any of the weapons
mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this section by an
officer of this state, or of any county or city therein, who is
entitled or required to carry such weapon as part of his
official equipment .... or by any special agent of a railway.
.. " Suppose an individual is arrested and tried for carry-
ing a pistol. Where do the burdens of proof lie as to
whether or not the accused is an "officer" or a "special rail-
road agent"? Since such defenses are extrinsic to the prose-
cution's initial burden of proof, it is often said that the
burden of proving them rests with the accused. 2 Hoch-
heimer explains this by saying that "in exceptional cases,
involving the commission of acts unlawful unless the de-
fendant possesses a special qualification or authority, and
where the proof lies peculiarly within his knowledge and
is easily producible by him, it has been held that the de-
fendant must prove himself within the exception.' 13
9Porter v. State, 200 Ga. 246, 36 S.E. 2d 794 (1946).0 1Floyd v. State, 205 Md. 573, 581, 109 A. 2d 729 (1954). (Emphasis
added).
n For a thorough study of statutory exceptions see Annot. 153 A.L.R.
1218 (1944).
13This reasoning does not apply where a statutory exception is incor-
porated in the description of the offense so as to constitute a part thereof.
Spurrier v. State, 229 Md. 110, 111, 182 A. 2d 358 (1962).
11 HocHmiiE, op. cit. supra, note 8, 176; as for double jeopardy, sub-
stitute the word "punishable" for the word "unlawful" in the above quota-
tion and the same reasoning would apply.
GUNTHER v. STATE
The Maryland Court of Appeals stated in Howes v.
State4 and recently reiterated in Spurrier v. State 5 that
the burden is on the defendant to prove that he comes
within one or more of the statutory exceptions. However,
since in both Howes and Spurrier the defendants had not
met the burden of producing evidence to raise a defense,
the court was dealing only with the initial burden of pro-
ducing evidence, and might have based its ruling on this
narrower ground. The good sense of requiring the defend-
ant to raise a genuine issue by introducing some kind of
evidence of such a defense as this is apparent, but it does
not follow that the burden of persuasion should be his.
The weight of authority is that, when evidence has been
presented which tends to bring the accused within a statu-
tory exception, the burden of persuasion is upon the prose-
cution on the whole case to overcome that evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt. 6 A minority rule would place the bur-
den on the defendant to establish the exceptive facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. 7 The minority rule, how-
ever, appears to violate the basic criminal law maxim that
the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The maxim does not require it to meet possible
defenses which are never raised, but it is difficult to see
why proving guilt does not entail proving it in the face of
any affirmative defenses supported by credible evidence.
(3) Lack of Mens Rea. Affirmative defense situations
not classified as "denial of participation" or "legal exemp-
tion" all have the common characteristic that the accused's
conduct is not criminal, because, in each case, the defendant
acted without mens rea. The most common forms of this
type of defense are insanity and self-defense.
For example, in a homicide case, the opinions are divided
as to whether the defendant must overcome the presump-
tions of malice and/or of sanity 8 arising from the prose-
cution's initial proof of an intentional killing, by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, or whether the defendant need
only produce some evidence to rebut them, in which case
the State must then disprove the defendant's contention
" 141 Md. 532, 539, 119 A. 297 (1922).
- 229 Md. 110, 182 A. 2d 358 (1962). The statute involved in Howes
prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors "except as hereinafter
provided. .. ."
"153 A.L.R. 1353 (1944). Spurrier was tried for carrying a concealed
weapon. He unsuccessfully contended that the State had the burden of
proving that defendant was not within certain classes of persons excepted
from the statutory prohibitions against carrying concealed weapons.
- Id., 1359.
" WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DiSORDEu AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 (1954).
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beyond a reasonable doubt,19 i.e., the State must then prove
the defendant's sane guilty mind beyond a reasonable
doubt, taking into account all of the evidence on both sides.
The federal courts and the Model Penal Code in its present
form adopt this view. 0 These authorities are in accord
with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Davis
v. United States:
"If the whole evidence, including that supplied by the
presumption of sanity, does not exclude beyond rea-
sonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of which
some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal of the specific offense charged."' 21
In Frank v. United States22 the court, referring to Davis,
stated: "This decision definitely places the federal courts
with those courts holding that where there is a reasonable
doubt as to whether the killing was or was not committed
in justifiable self-defense the defendant is entitled to the
acquittal." The reasoning behind this view is that, as to
crimes where the state of mind is an element of the offense,
without a "criminal" state of mind there can be no crime
committed. Therefore, if the jury entertains a reasonable
doubt as to the mens rea of the accused, it is in doubt as to
his guilt.23
With the instant decision, Maryland appears to adopt
the contrary view, which is that the defendant has the
burden of proving his lack of guilty mind by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and that the prosecution need not
prove the whole of this element of the case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
Prior to Gunther the court had been presented with this
issue in relation to the question whether the accused was
required to overcome the presumption of sanity by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, or whether, after evidence of de-
193 UNFIannLL's CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 642, 660 (5th ed. 1956).
20MODEL PENAL CODE, OP. Cit. supra, note 6, § 1.12(1): "No person may
be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof the innocence of
the defendant is assumed." § 1.12(2) : "Subsection (1) of this Section
does not: (a) require the disposal of an affirmative defense unless and
until there is evidence supporting such defense ... " (Emphasis added).
2 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895).
-42 F. 2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1930).
State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 P. 98, 102 (1904) ; contra Common-
wealth v. Palmer, 222 Pa. 299, 71 A. 100, 101 (1908). "To reasonably doubt
that life was taken in self-defense is not to be satisfied that it was so
taken; and where this affirmative defense is left in doubt, it has not been
established as a basis for acquittal." Comment, Burden of Prouing Self
Defense in Homicide Cases, 39 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
189 (1948-49) and DeGroot v. United States, 78 F. 2d 244 (9th Cir. 1935).
GUNTHER v. STATE
fendant's insanity had been introduced, the burden shifted
to the state to prove defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. In every case the court avoided resolving the prob-
lem on the ground that the issue was not before it because
of the lack of any real evidence of defendant's insanity.24
It will be interesting to note whether the court will now
use the instant case to support a future decision placing
the burden of proving insanity, by a preponderance of evi-
dence, on the defendant.
In the instant case the Court of Appeals affirmed the
refusal of the trial court to inform the jury that it should
acquit the defendant if, on the whole of the evidence, it
had a reasonable doubt whether or not he acted in self-
defense. Where this refusal has been upheld in other states,
such refusal has been based on the following reasons:
1. that such an affirmative defense, being opposed to
the usual order of things, must be established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; 25 and,
2. that the presumption of sanity and/or malice is
necessary for the protection of society and for the admin-
istration of justice, and, on sufficient proof of the elements
of the prosecution's main case to take the case to the jury,
neutralizes the presumption of innocence upon which the
rule of reasonable doubt rests.26
In reaching its conclusion in Gunther the Court of
Appeals did not refer to either of these reasons, but con-
cluded that "the defendant has the burden of producing
evidence to support this affirmative defense"27 and cited
Bruce v. State.2" The court in that opinion, however, was
referring not to the burden of persuasion, but to the burden
of going forward with the evidence, which burden the
defendant in Gunther had met.29
Note, Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases. 15 Md. L. Rev.
157 (1955), noting Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A. 2d 913 (1955). For
a more recent statement by the Court of Appeals, see Lipscomb v. State,
223 Md. 599, 604, 165 A. 2d 918 (1960). It is interesting to note that the
casenote author concluded that though the court in Thomas avoided
deciding the issue, it "was obviously in favor of placing the burden on the
defendant." Note, supra, 166. The subsequent Lipscomb decision appears
to have had this in mind and therefore the court took pains to make clear
that it was making no decision as to the burden of proof.
2 Supra, note 23.
2 For a general historical criticism of the use or misuse of the reasonable
doubt concept from its inception, see Some Rules of Evidence - Reason-
able Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 Am. L. Rev. 642 (1876).
228 Md. 404, 410, 179 A. 2d 880 (1962). (Emphasis added).
218 Md. 87, 145 A. 2d 428 (1958).
- The court said that "there was some evidence that the defendant had
acted in defense of himself. . . ." Supra, note 28, 408. Query: Would the
confusion between the burden of going forward with the evidence and the
1964]
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The court also stated in Gunther:
"[S]ince all of the evidence in a criminal case must
be considered together, the trier of the facts should
not weigh the evidence relating to self-defense and
determine from that alone whether there is a reason-
able doubt of guilt. * * * It is thus apparent that the
burden of proving self-defense to the satisfaction of
the jury or the court (as the case may be) is on the
defendant. 3 °
The only authority cited for this statement was Basoff v.
State." There the defendant attempted to establish an alibi
and the court, citing Floyd,3 2 stated, "All the evidence in
a criminal case is to be considered together, and the jury,
or the trial judge sitting without a jury, does not merely
weigh the evidence relating to the alibi and determine from
that alone whether there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."'3
However, in Gunther the defendant did not request that
the jury merely weigh the evidence relating to self-defense
and determine from that alone whether there was a rea-
sonable doubt of guilt. What the defendant did request
was that the jury find him not guilty if, on the whole of the
evidence, it had a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted
in self-defense. In effect, the court said that the jury can-
not separately consider that part of the evidence in the
case relating to self-defense in order to determine guilt
as a whole. However, the defendant had requested that
the jury consider the evidence of the case as a whole to
determine whether an essential element of the crime (mens
rea) was lacking. Defendant's request was certainly con-
sistent with the language in Floyd v. State,34 previously
quoted, but the court, instead of considering the defend-
burden of persuasion have been eliminated and an instruction granted if
defendant had requested the following instruction in Jenkins v. State,
80 Or. Cr. 328, 161 P. 2d 90, 107 (1945) : "When the killing is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the defendant, and the plea
of self-defense is interposed, as in this case, it then devolves upon the
defendant to show any circumstances to excuse or justify it by some proof
strong enough to create in your minds a reasonable doubt as to whether
the defendant acted in real or apparent necessary self-defense, unless the
proof on the part of the State shows that the defendant was justified in
committing the act."
Supra, note 27, 411.
hi208 Md. 643, 119 A. 2d 917 (1956).
205 Md. 573, 109 A. 2d 729 (1954).
Supra, note 31, 655.
"If the jury, considering all the evidence, inculpatory and exculpatory,
maintain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's participation in the crime
they should acquit him." 205 Md. 573, 581, 109 A. 2d 729 (1954).
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ant's request as stated, 5 apparently misunderstood it 6 and
then disposed of the request in the misunderstood form.
The defendant's view would appear to be the more
logical one. Since proving mens rea is vital to the State's
case in homicide prosecutions, if the defendant can create
a reasonable doubt as to his state of mind it would appear
that the State has not established its case.
37
DAVID S. KLEIN
Interference With 'Contracts Terminable At Will
Clarke Langrall, Incorporated v.
Shamrock Savings & Loan Association, Inc.'
Plaintiff insurance agent contracted with one Thomp-
son to insure the latter's home. Thompson then applied to
defendant for a mortgage loan in his home. He was told
by defendant that his present insurance policy was unac-
ceptable and that he should insure through another insurer,
of which an officer of defendant company was agent. His
contract with plaintiff contained a provision for cancella-
tion at any time at the request of the insured. Thompson
exercised his option to terminate and entered into a similar
contract with defendant. Plaintiff thereupon brought this
action against defendant for wrongfully inducing Thomp-
son to break contractual relations with plaintiff. In finding
for defendant, Chief Judge Rhynhart of the People's Court
of Baltimore City held that defendant did not cause a
breach of contract, but merely induced Thompson to exer-
cise his contractual right to cancel the policy with plaintiff.
"That it (the jury) should find the defendant not guilty if, on the
whole of the evidence, it had a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he
acted in self-defense." 228 Md. 404, 408, 179 A. 2d 880 (1962).
W The court stated: "Apparently the defendant is contending that when
a defendant pleads self-defense 'the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of himself. Such is not the
law. On the contrary, the defendant has the burden of proditeing evidence
to support this affirmative defense." Ibid. (Emphasis added).
Strahorn, Criminology and the Law of Guilt, 15 Md. L. Rev. 287 (1955).
Strahorn states, "If the prosecution fails to prove beyond all reasonable
doubt that any one of three elements of guilt of any crime, viz, the corpus
delecti, defendant's causation, and requisite mens rea, the defendant is
entitled to be acquitted. . . . Just as the absence of sufficient proof of the
prosecution's case on the mens rea element calls for an acquittal, so does
the proof of affirmative facts in defense which reach the same end as
the lack of the prosecution's case." Ibid, 320.
1 Daily Record, October 19, 1962 (Md. 1962).
